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We report the distribution of a cryptographic key, secure from photon number splitting attacks,
over 35 km of optical fiber using single photons from an InAs quantum dot emitting ∼ 1.3 µm in
a pillar microcavity. Using below GaAs-bandgap optical excitation, we demonstrate suppression of
multiphoton emission to 10% of the Poissonian level without detector dark count subtraction. The
source is incorporated into a phase encoded interferometric scheme implementing the BB84 protocol
for key distribution over standard telecommunication optical fiber. We show a transmission distance
advantage over that possible with (length-optimized) uniform intensity weak coherent pulses at
1310 nm in the same system.
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The majority of experimental realizations demon-
strating quantum key distribution (QKD) have relied
on encoding information onto weak coherent pulses
(WCPs).1,2,3 Due to the Poissonian nature of laser light,
there is a finite probability of generating two or more
photons per pulse from such a source. This opens up a
security threat where an eavesdropper, Eve, can take ad-
vantage of these extra photons by performing a photon
number splitting (PNS) attack.4 To compensate for this
security loophole, the transmitter, Alice, has to attenu-
ate the signal by an amount that increases with distance,
which reduces the transmission rate and ultimately limits
the maximum secure transmission distance to the autho-
rized recipient, Bob.5 Decoy-pulse techniques have been
developed to help mitigate the risks associated with mul-
tiphoton pulse emission,6,7 and PNS secure key distribu-
tion distances are now starting to exceed those achieved
with uniform pulse intensities.8
A single quantum emitter will exhibit “anti-bunching”
of the photon emission times,9 such that a regulated
stream of single photons with zero probability of emitting
more than one photon in any given excitation pulse can
be expected. Applying an efficient single quantum emit-
ter in a cryptographic system would outperform all other
methods developed to date. Several experiments using
single photons with wavelengths compatible with silicon
technology have already been used for QKD. These in-
clude using a stream of single-photon pulses generated
by a single nitrogen-vacancy color center in a diamond10
and emission from a quantum dot.11 Telecom wavelength
QKD has been achieved by using pairs of photons pro-
duced via spontaneous parametric down conversion.12,13
In this letter we demonstrate QKD using an optically-
excited, triggered single-photon source (SPS) emitting at
a telecom wavelength. Our source, which shows a ten-fold
reduction in multi-photon emission compared to a laser,
has been used to distribute keys secure from the PNS at-
tack over 35 km along standard optical fiber. By apply-
ing a security analysis for imperfect devices (GLLP),14
we demonstrate a transmission distance advantage com-
pared to the same system configuration incorporating
uniform intensity pulses from a laser source at the same
wavelength.
We have previously demonstrated that a low density
of telecom wavelength dots can be achieved through a bi-
modal growth technique15 and we have used this method
to fabricate a SPS. Our source is based on an InAs quan-
tum dot embedded at the center of a GaAs spacer in
a distributed Bragg reflector (DBR) pillar microcavity
∼ 3 µm in diameter. The DBR mirrors consist of alter-
nating layers of GaAs and Al0.98Ga0.02As, each with a
designed thickness corresponding to one-quarter optical
wavelength. The cavity was formed with 11 periods on
top and 30 periods on the bottom of a nominally three-
optical-wavelength thick spacer layer. The sample was
placed in a custom built confocal microscope which was
cooled in a variable temperature continuous flow liquid
helium cryostat.
Below GaAs-bandgap laser pulses at 1064 nm were
used to trigger photon emission from the quantum dot.
At this wavelength electron-hole pairs are created in
highly excited states of the dot. The telecom wave-
length quantum dots used here offer stronger confine-
ment than dots emitting below 1 µm and several shells
are expected to be confined. The photogenerated car-
riers are expected to thermalize down to lower energy
configurations in time scales shorter than the radiative
lifetime. Maximum single-photon signal from the device
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2FIG. 1: a) Normalized PL spectrum recorded ∼ 71 K be-
fore spectral filtering under 1064 nm excitation at satura-
tion power. Correlation measurements (∼ 71 K) on the spec-
trally filtered emission line with b) 1064 nm excitation pulsed
at 80 MHz at low power (∼ 102 µW) with APDs gated at
594 kHz, c) 1064 nm laser excitation at 1 MHz around satu-
ration power (∼ 2.5 µW at this frequency) with detection at
1 MHz and d) 780 nm excitation pulsed at 80 MHz near sat-
uration power (∼ 57 µW) with detection at 594 kHz. Counts
within 150 µs of a preceding count in the same detector were
rejected to limit the effect of afterpulsing. Powers quoted refer
to the average power at the input of the microscope.
was achieved at ∼ 71 K where a charged exciton was on
resonance with the HE11 cavity mode [Fig. 1(a)]. We
have measured suppression of g(2)(0) = 0.102 ± 0.004
as shown in Fig. 1(b) without any subtraction of back-
ground emission or detector dark counts. We believe that
this is the lowest measured value of g(2)(0) reported to
date from a quantum dot emitting at a telecom wave-
length.
For the purpose of quantum key distribution the source
was operated with excitation intensities around those
where the emission line shows maximum intensity. In this
case we measured g(2)(0) = 0.166 ± 0.005 with 1064 nm
optical excitation [Fig. 1(c)]. This is markedly lower
than for excitation at 780 nm where a value of g(2)(0) =
0.392± 0.011 was obtained [Fig. 1(d)]. With below-band
excitation, we measure an efficiency of ∼ 5.1% after cou-
pling into single-mode fiber (SMF28). This is the high-
est useful efficiency reported to date at a telecom wave-
length and was demonstrated with a simultaneously good
g(2)(0) = 0.166, measured without subtraction of back-
ground or detector dark counts. (The efficiency quoted
above was calculated using the correlation measurement
count rates. If the finite measured g(2)(0) is assumed
to have arisen from a Poissonian background a single-
photon efficiency of 4.6% would be estimated.) Even
higher efficiencies may be achieved by optimizing the cou-
pling of the source to single mode fiber and reducing the
FIG. 2: A schematic diagram showing the fiber optic quan-
tum key distribution system. SPS: single-photon source;
WDM: wavelength division multiplexer; SF: spectral fil-
ter; PC: polarization controller; PBS: polarizing beam split-
ter/combiner; FS: fiber stretcher. Standard telecom fibers are
used in the link between Alice and Bob.
roughness of the micropillars to enhance the cavity qual-
ity factor.16
Our key distribution system is based upon a time di-
vision Mach-Zender interferometer using phase modula-
tion, as shown in Fig. 2. The system is an extension
of that which our group has used to demonstrate key
distribution using WCPs emitting at 1550 nm.17,18 How-
ever, in this case, we employ our quantum dot source
in place of an attenuated laser and multiplex it with a
1.55 µm clock laser, which is used as a timing reference.
The source is optically pumped with picosecond-pulsed
1064 nm laser light from a semiconductor laser diode at
a frequency of 1 MHz. A third laser, emitting around
the same wavelength as the source, is introduced to pro-
vide feedback to a fiber stretcher which minimizes any
path mismatch in the two interfering routes.18 The BB84
protocol19 is implemented by encoding/decoding bit in-
formation through phase modulators in the two inter-
fering paths1,3 and key distribution using the SPS was
optimized over 35 km of optical fiber. InGaAs avalanche
photodiodes (APDs) operating in gated mode at 1 MHz
(∼ 165 K) were used to detect the interfering single pho-
tons. The detectors used are around 9% efficient at the
source wavelength and in the system each gave a typical
count probability of 0.87×10−6 per gate with the SPS
disabled. Of this we attribute a probability of 0.82×10−6
per gate to detector dark counts and the remainder due
to stray counts originating from the lasers. We estimate
a 7.9 dB loss in Alice, a 1.7 dB loss in Bob and use
standard SMF28 telecom fiber with a measured loss of
12.8 dB through the fiber link. An average visibility of
∼ 99.7%, after dark count correction, was achieved and
is shown in Fig. 3(a).
A 7 kbit sifted key was distributed with a quantum
bit error rate (QBER) of 5.9% [see Fig. 3(b)]. Based on
the GLLP theory for imperfect devices in Gottesman et
al.,14 (specifically theorem 6) we can deduce that the key
exchange would have been secure against the PNS at-
tack given the measured value of g(2)(0) of 0.166. Eve is
assumed to have the full technological capabilities neces-
sary to access all the information carried by the residual
multiphoton pulses and those pulses contributing to the
QBER. In the security analysis for the SPS, the multi-
3FIG. 3: a) Counts as a function of time on APD1 and APD2
showing a 98.5% visibility before dark count correction and
b) variation in the QBER over the course of a key transfer
over 35 km of fiber. Each bin represents a sample of 500 sifted
bits.
photon probability is reduced from ∼µ2/2 in the WCP
case to ∼ g(2)(0)× µ2/2, where µ is the average number
of photons per pulse.
We now compare the performance of our single-photon
BB84 setup with that which could be achieved using
1310 nm WCPs in the same system according to GLLP
theory. The comparison is made by taking the same
detector gating conditions and assuming the same dark
count probability and detection efficiency. In both cases
the quantum bit errors in the raw key were taken to con-
sist of half the sum of the dark and stray counts plus
2.6% of the raw bit rate due to errors in the phase mod-
ulators etc. The error correction algorithm was taken to
use 1.17 times the number of bits specified in the Shan-
non limit.20,21 For each fiber length up to ∼ 28 km there
exists a range of µ for which unconditionally secure QKD
using WCPs is possible. Between the upper bound gov-
erned by the PNS attack and a lower bound governed
by the dark (and stray light) count contribution to the
QBER, an optimal laser intensity exists for which the
maximal secure bit rate can be obtained. It is this opti-
mally attenuated laser performance at 1310 nm that we
compare to our SPS performance in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4 shows that key distribution with our dot source
has a quantitative advantage at long distances compared
with that which could be securely achieved using uni-
form intensity laser pulses at 1310 nm. We note that
for transmission distances greater than ∼ 11 km a higher
bit rate is achieved with the SPS. For short transmission
distances WCP systems are favorable as higher bit rates,
due to the higher photon flux, can be achieved. How-
ever, this is an advantage which could be overcome by
improving the performance of our SPS.
We have demonstrated single-photon quantum key dis-
tribution using a quantum dot source emitting near
1.3 µm. The source was excited below the GaAs-bandgap
and showed strong suppression of multi-photon emission
to ∼ 10% of the Poissonian level without detector dark
count subtraction. The below GaAs-bandgap excitation
was responsible for the high quality single-photon emis-
sion. We distributed a key secure against the PNS attack
over 35 km. These results highlight the potential advan-
tage of single-photon QKD for long distance quantum
cryptography through an existing telecom infrastructure.
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FIG. 4: Theoretical evaluation comparing the PNS secure
transmission distance of our SPS (solid blue curve) with an
equivalent WCP system (dashed curve). The solid red curve
shows the theoretical sifted bit rate of the SPS. The data
points represent our experimental sifted bit rate (square) and
secure bit rate (triangle). The inset shows the calculated
QBER (line) with the measured value.
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